OBERGEFELL V. HODGES: HOW THE SUPREME COURT
SHOULD HAVE DECIDED THE CASE
Adam Lamparello*
***
In Obergefell, et al. v. Hodges, Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion
legalizing same-sex marriage was based on “the mystical aphorisms of a
fortune cookie,” 1 and “indefensible as a matter of constitutional law.”2
Kennedy’s opinion was comprised largely of philosophical ramblings
about liberty that have neither a constitutional foundation nor any
conceptual limitation. The fictional opinion below arrives at the same
conclusion, but the reasoning is based on equal protection rather than
due process principles. The majority opinion holds that same-sex
marriage bans violate the Equal Protection Clause because they: (1)
discriminate on the basis of gender; (2) promote gender-based
stereotypes; and (3) reflect animus toward same-sex couples. This
approach roots the right to same-sex marriage more firmly in the
Constitution’s text and reflects judicial restraint.

* Assistant Professor of Law and Associate Dean of Experiential Learning, Indiana Tech Law
School.
1. Obergefell, et al. v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2630 n.22 (2015) (June 26, 2015) (Scalia,
J., dissenting).
2. Id. at 2616 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNIFIED STATES
Obergefell v. Hodges
Justice Equality delivered the opinion of the Court, which was
joined by Justices Gender Equality, Gender Stereotyping, Fairness,
Freedom, Anti-Animus, and Anti-Discrimination.
Justice Liberty concurred in the result.
Chief Justice Restraint filed a dissenting opinion.
The cases involve challenges to same-sex marriage bans
nationwide. The petitioners claim that such bans violate the fundamental
right to marriage under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court of
Appeals rejected petitioners’ claim. We granted certiorari, and now
reverse.
***
The role of a judge is “to persuade . . . not pontificate.” Justice Ruth
Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1185,
1186 (1992).
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
provides that no state shall ”deny to any person . . . the equal protection
of the laws.” Amend. XIV, §1. Our jurisprudence has conditioned the
level of scrutiny we apply to laws implicating equal protection
guarantees on the nature of the right infringed.
As a general matter, “legislation is presumed to be valid and will be
sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to
a legitimate state interest.” City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living
Center, 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985); see also Schweiker v. Wilson, 450
U.S. 221, 230 (1981); United States Railroad Retirement Board v.
Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 174-175 (1980).
However, laws drawing classifications on the basis of “race,
alienage, or national origin,” City of Cleburne, supra at 440, or
infringing on fundamental rights will pass constitutional muster only if
they are “suitably tailored to serve a compelling state interest.” Ibid. at
440; see also McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964); Skinner
v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
The Equal Protection Clause also applies to laws discriminating on
the basis of gender. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686
(1973) (what differentiates sex from . . . non-suspect statuses as
intelligence
or
physical
disability . . .
is
that
the sex
characteristic frequently bears no relation to ability to perform or
contribute to society”). Indeed “different statutory treatment . . . solely
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on account of the sex of the similarly situated individuals . . . is patently
inconsistent with the promise of equal protection of the laws.” Nguyen v.
INS, 533 U.S. 53, 86 (2001); see also Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 77
(1971) (“By providing dissimilar treatment for men and women who are
thus similarly situated, the challenged section violates the Equal
Protection Clause”). As the United States Supreme Court has stated,
“[r]ather than resting on meaningful considerations, statutes distributing
benefits and burdens between the sexes in different ways very likely
reflect outmoded notions of the relative capabilities of men and women.”
City of Cleburne, supra, at 441. Accordingly, a gender-based
classification “generally provides no sensible ground for differential
treatment.” Ibid. at 440. Laws discriminating based on gender are
subject to intermediate scrutiny, which requires the State to demonstrate
that the classification is substantially related to an important
governmental interest. See ibid. at 441; see also Craig v. Boren, 429
U.S. 190 (1976); cf. Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc. 510 U.S. 17 (1993)
(going so far as to say that “it remains an open question whether
‘classifications based upon gender are inherently suspect”).
Additionally, states may not enact laws carrying with them “the
baggage of sexual stereotypes,” Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 283 (1979).
Such laws will be invalidated absent the showing of an “exceedingly
persuasive” justification. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533
(1996); see also J.E.B v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 139 n.11 (1994) (“We
have made abundantly clear in past cases that gender classifications that
rest on impermissible stereotypes violate the Equal Protection Clause,
even when some statistical support can be conjured up for the
generalization”); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251
(1989) (“We are beyond the day when an employer could evaluate
employees by assuming or insisting that they matched
the stereotype associated with their group”); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld,
420 U.S. 636, 645 (1975) (invalidating a stereotype-based classification
even though the underlying generalization was “not entirely without
empirical support”). Thus, a state is prohibited from “excluding
qualified individuals based on ‘fixed notions concerning the roles and
abilities
of
males
and
females.’” Ibid.
(emphasis
added) (quoting Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S.
718, 725 (1982). Put differently, states may not enact laws that rely on
“overbroad generalizations about the different talents, capacities, or
preferences of males and females.’” United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S.
515, 541 (1996). These rules apply with particular force when the State
controls the “gates to opportunity,” Virginia, supra at 533 (internal
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citation omitted).
The United States Supreme Court cases involving sex-based
classifications, rooted in gender stereotypes, are instructive. In Nguyen,
the Court invalidated 8 U.S.C. § 10409(a)(4), which made it more
difficult for a child born out of wedlock to claim citizenship to a United
States parent who was a father. 533 U.S. at 56-57. Justice O’Connor
issued a concurring opinion, in which she argued that the State’s asserted
interest in achieving “the goal of a ‘real, practical relationship,’” ibid. at
88 (quoting Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 482–483 (1998)) (Breyer,
J., dissenting), between the child and a biological parent “finds support
not in biological differences but instead in a stereotype—i.e., ’the
generalization that mothers are significantly more likely than fathers . . .
to develop caring relationships with their children.’” Nguyen, supra, at
88-89 (quoting Miller, supra, at 482–483 (Breyer, J., dissenting)).
Justice O’Connor observed that the statute at issue in Nguyen
“relie[d] on ‘the very stereotype the law condemns,’” ibid. at 89
(quoting J.E.B., supra at 138) (brackets added) (internal quotation marks
omitted), “lends credibility,” Mississippi Univ. for Women, supra at 730,
to the generalization that women are better parents than men, and helps
to convert that belief into “a self-fulfilling prophecy.” Ibid. Justice
O’Connor also recognized that the “hallmark of a stereotypical sexbased classification under this Court’s precedents is not whether the
classification is insulting, but whether it “relie[s] upon the simplistic,
outdated assumption that gender could be used as a ‘proxy for other,
more germane bases of classification.’” Nguyen, supra at 90 (O’Connor,
J., concurring) (quoting Mississippi Univ. for Women, supra at 730)
(quoting Craig, supra, at 198); see also J.E.B., supra at 138 (“[w]hen
state actors exercise peremptory challenges in reliance on gender
stereotypes, they ratify and reinforce prejudicial views of the relative
abilities of men and women”).
These principles were expressed in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore
Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998), which involved an allegation of sex
discrimination under Title VII between two males. In Oncale, the Court
held that nothing in Title VII necessarily “bars a claim of discrimination
‘because of sex’ merely because the plaintiff and the defendant . . . are
of the same sex.” Ibid. at 79 (internal citation omitted); accord Newport
News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 682
(discrimination “because of . . . sex” protects men and women).
Similarly, in Nichols v. Azteca Restaurant Enterprises, Inc., 256 F.3d
864 (9th Cir. 2001), the plaintiff brought a Title VII claim against his
male co-workers for a number of allegedly demeaning statements,
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including that he carried his serving tray “like a woman,” and that he
was a “faggot” and a “fucking female whore.” Ibid. at 870. The Ninth
Circuit held that these statements created an “objectively and
subjectively hostile” work environment in violation of Title VII. Ibid. at
871 (quoting Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787
(1998)). The Ninth Circuit noted that Title VII discrimination applies
“with equal force to a man who is discriminated against for acting too
feminine.” Nichols, supra at 874. Underlying Oncale and Nichols was an
implicit recognition that the State may not enact laws that have the sole
or primary purpose to re-enforce assumptions about how each gender
does or should behave.
In addition, the Equal Protection Clause prohibits states from
enacting laws that are motivated by animus against a particular group.
See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding that bans on
interracial marriage violated the Equal Protection Clause). The Loving
Court held that such bans rested “solely upon distinctions drawn
according to race,” ibid. at 11, a distinction that was “odious to a free
people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality.”‘
Ibid. (quoting Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943)).
Furthermore, the “fact that Virginia prohibits only interracial marriages
involving white persons,” ibid. at 11, revealed that the statute codified
animus against African-Americans.
These cases embrace three equal protection principles. First, states
may not discriminate on the basis of sex absent a showing that the law in
question substantially relates to an important governmental interest.
Second, sex-based classifications that are predicated on stereotypical
presuppositions of men and women will only be sustained if the state
comes forth with an “exceedingly persuasive” justification. See Virginia,
supra at 533; accord Miller, supra at 482-83. Third, a law may not have
as its sole or primary motivating factor animus against a particular
group. Because same-sex marriage bans fail on all three fronts, we deem
it unnecessary to entertain the question of whether laws drawing
classifications on the basis of sexual orientation warrant strict,
intermediate, or rational basis review.
First, same-sex marriage bans facially discriminate on the basis of
gender. As Chief Justice Restraint stated at oral argument, “If Sue loves
Joe and Tom loves Joe, Sue can marry Joe but Tom cannot.” Transcript
of Oral Argument. Such laws “have all the formal structure of
discrimination on the basis of sex in that, but for a gay person’s sex, his
or her treatment by the law would be different.” Mary Anne Case, The
Very Stereotype the Law Condemns: Constitutional Sex Discrimination
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Law As a Quest for Perfect Proxies, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1447, 1486
(2000); see also Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993) (same-sex
marriage bans constitute impermissible gender-based discrimination and
thus violate the Equal Protection Clause). Furthermore, same-sex
marriage bans have a “subordinating taint, in that among their normative
premises are that women should not be free of men and that men should
not behave sexually as women do.” Case, supra, at 1488. In this way,
same-sex marriage bans harm both genders equally and provide no basis
upon which to immunize such bans from equal protection guarantees.
See Loving, 388 U.S. at 8 (the mere ‘equal application’ of a statute does
not mean that it passes muster under the Equal protection Clause).
The State fares no better with respect gender stereotyping. To begin
with, “by restricting marriage to different sex couples, a state is
presuming—or insisting—that men and women perform different roles
in marriage and that the different roles are rooted in their maleness and
femaleness.” Suzanne B. Goldberg, Risky Arguments in Social Justice
Litigation: The Case of Sex Discrimination and Marriage Equality, 114
COLUM. L. REV. 2087, 2100 (2014); see also New York in Trigg v. New
York City Transit Authority, No. 99-CV-4730 (ILG), 2001 WL 868336
(E.D.N.Y. July 26, 2001) (holding that discrimination on the basis of
gender stereotyping is the equivalent of discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation). Simply put, same-sex marriage bans are predicated
“on fixed notions concerning the roles and abilities of men and women.”
Mississippi Univ. for Women, 458 U.S. at 725. Furthermore, “to the
extent that sexuality is sex-based and lesbian women and gay men are
prohibited from entering into their chosen marriages by a samesex marriage prohibition, these laws discriminate against lesbian women
and gay men both as individuals and as members of their sex group on
the basis of sex.” Virginia, supra, at 542.
These propositions breathe life into an important principle: samesex marriage promotes inequality on the basis of gender, regardless of
sexual orientation. Underlying same-sex marriage bans is an
assumption—rooted in gender stereotyping—that men and women have
specific roles that limit their ability to freely associate and make intimate
personal choices. See, e.g., Whitney Woodington, The Cognitive
Foundations of Formal Equality: Incorporating Gender Schema Theory
to Eliminate Sex-Discrimination Toward Women in the Legal
Profession, 34 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 135, 142 (2010) (“[g]ender role
stereotypes adversely affect both sexes. Just as women are dissociated
from the agentic qualities attributed to traditionally masculine roles, men
are likewise—and often more strongly—discouraged from exhibiting
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communal traits”).
Additionally, gender stereotypes disparately impact women, for
they reinforce outdated views of women as subordinate to, or merely
complimentary of, their male counterparts. See Orr, supra at 279-80
(“allocation of family responsibilities under which the wife plays a
dependent role” could not “justify a statute that discriminates on the
basis of gender”). One commentator explains:
Even if legislative history does not explicitly demonstrate that samesex marriage prohibitions were enacted to subordinate women, the
state’s reliance on concepts such as gender complementarity, as well as
the hierarchy and asymmetry it implies, indicates that these laws are
grounded in prohibited sex-role stereotyping. Justin Reinheimer, What
Lawrence Should Have Said, 96 CAL L. REV. 505, 543 (2008).

In this way, same-sex marriage bans do not only place same-sex
couples on unequal footing, they undermine the rights of members of
both genders to fully and freely express their marital preference
“because of . . . sex,” Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co.
supra at 682, and they disparately impact women by indirectly reenforcing a stereotype about the role of women in society. As such,
same-sex marriage bans carry with them the “baggage of sexual
stereotypes,” Orr, supra at 283, and exclude “qualified individuals
[from marriage] based on ‘fixed notions concerning the roles and
abilities of males and females.’” Virginia, supra at 541, (quoting
Mississippi Univ. for Women, supra at 725). Indeed, “[r]ather than
resting on meaningful considerations, statutes distributing benefits and
burdens between the sexes in different ways,” City of Cleburne, supra,
at 441, as is the case here, “reflect outmoded notions of the relative
capabilities of men and women.” Ibid.
Furthermore, the harm resulting from same-sex marriage bans
underscores the inequality they occasion and the animus they embody.
By limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples, same-sex couples are
deprived of numerous federal and state benefits including, but not
limited to, “estate tax, Social Security, housing, taxes, criminal
sanctions, copyright, and veterans’ benefits.” United States v. Windsor,
133 S. Ct. 2675, 2694 (June 26, 2013). In this respect, same-sex
marriage bans harm both same-sex couples and their children by making
them unequal in the eyes of the law based on both the sexual orientation
and gender.
In the fact of such harms, the State has no adduced evidence
demonstrating that same-sex marriage bans serve an important
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governmental interest, or that they are supported by an “exceedingly
persuasive” justification. The State’s assertion that limiting marriage to
opposite-sex couples is justified by the interests in procreation and
childrearing cannot withstand even a cursory analysis of the practical
realities about marriage. Many opposite-sex couples choose not to have
children, and the State does not condition marriage licenses upon a
showing of procreative intent or sterility. See Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d
648 (7th Cir. 2014). Furthermore, the State’s interest in promoting a
stable home for children counsel in favor of permitting same-sex
marriages, both for the commitment that marriage reflects and the
federal and state benefits it engenders. The only conclusion that can be
drawn from this is that same-sex marriage bans are motivated by “moral
disapproval of a group.” Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 583 (O’Connor, J.,
concurring), precisely the type of animus that the Equal Protection
Clause prohibits, and the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence forbids.
***
In his concurring opinion, Justice Liberty argues that same-sex
marriage bans violate the fundamental right to marriage under the
Fourteenth Amendment, including the associated rights to personal
autonomy, privacy, intimate association, to define one’s identity, and to
“equal dignity” under the law. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct.
2675 (2013) (holding that a portion of the Defense of marriage Act
defining marriage as the union of opposite-sex couples violated
respondents’ rights to equal dignity); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558
(2003) (invalidating a ban on sodomy between same-sex couples);
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (reaffirming the
central holding in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, and holding that states
may not place an undue burden on a woman’s right to an abortion);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that a ban on
contraception violated the right to marital privacy).
Whatever the merits of this position, we find it unnecessary to
premise our holding on such broad prescriptions. See ante at 2593-94
(Liberty, J., concurring) (same sex couples have a fundamental right to
“define and express their identity,” and to “find a life that could not be
found alone, for a marriage becomes greater than just the two persons”). 3
Prudence and restraint counsel in favor of going no further than
necessary to remedy the harm at issue, lest we inadvertently lay the
groundwork for the recognition of unforeseen and unintended new
rights, or invite uncertainty regarding the scope and application of this
3.

Obergefell, 135 S.Ct. at 2593-2594 (citing to Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion).
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holding. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997)
(expressing reluctance “to expand the concept of substantive due process
because guideposts for responsible decision making in this unchartered
area are scarce and open-ended”). As the Supreme Court held in
Glucksberg, establishing “guideposts for responsible decision making,”
Glucksberg, supra at 721, is intended to “direct and restrain our
exposition of the Due Process Clause,” ibid., and requires “a ‘careful
description’ of the asserted fundamental liberty interest.” This approach
ensures that courts “exercise the utmost care whenever we are asked to
break new ground in this field.” Ibid. at 720 (quoting Collins v. Harker
Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992)); Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S.
494, 502 (1977)).
Justice Liberty’s concurrence disregards the principles, employing
language that makes it more, not less, likely that our decision would
have unanticipated effects. Of course, it may be true that marriage
“offers the hope of companionship and understanding and assurance that
while both still live there will be someone to care for the other,” ante at
2593 4, or that “choices about marriage shape an individual’s destiny,”
ante at 2599 5, but as a matter of constitutional law, these statements are
of no significance. It is also unclear whether the concept of “equal
dignity,” relied on by Justice Liberty in Windsor and Lawrence, can be
applied in a manner that is workable, restrained, and respectful of the
democratic process. That, in a nutshell, is the point. Justice Liberty’s
concurrence creates ambiguity, not clarity, engenders confusion, not
guidance, and invites discord, not harmony, among lower courts.
For example, one can imagine, in the not-too-distant future, that
members of polygamist marriages will claim that the right to “intimate
association” and “equal dignity” under the law bestow upon them a
fundamental right to marriage. Chief Justice Restraint captured this
sentiment in his dissent:
Although the concurrence randomly inserts the adjective “two” in
various places, it offers no reason at all why the two-person element of
the core definition of marriage may be preserved while the manwoman element may not. Indeed, from the standpoint of history and
tradition, a leap from opposite-sex marriage to same-sex marriage is
much greater than one from a two-person union to plural unions, which
have deep roots in some cultures around the world. If the majority is
willing to take the big leap, it is hard to see how it can say no to the

4.
5.

Id. at 2593.
Id. at 2599.
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shorter one. Ante at 2621 (Restraint, C.J., dissenting).

Without entertaining the merits of such a claim, the fact that Justice
Liberty’s holding could—and likely would—have additional
implications outside of the same-sex marriage context ipso facto
counsels in favor of a narrower holding. This is true, a fortiori, when
there exists a narrower textual basis—the Equal Protection Clause—
upon which to invalidate same-sex marriage bans. See Lawrence, 539
U.S. at 583 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“[m]oral disapproval of a group
cannot be a legitimate state interest under the Equal Protection Clause
because legal classifications must not be ‘drawn for the purpose of
disadvantaging the group burdened by the law.’”) (internal citation
omitted).
It was perhaps for these reasons that the Baehr Court specifically
rejected the proposition that “a right to same-sex marriage is so rooted in
the traditions and collective conscience of our people that failure to
recognize it would violate the fundamental principles of liberty and
justice that lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions.”
Baehr, supra at 57. The court also rejected the argument that “a right to
same-sex marriage is implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that
neither liberty nor justice would exist if it were sacrificed.” Ibid. It is for
the same reasons that we eschew a holding of such breadth that its
contours would be as elusive as its conceptual limitations would be
uncertain.
For these reasons, we believe it prudent to frame the right to samesex marriage in language necessary for, but not more extensive than, that
needed to ensure its protection. We also believe that today’s decision
standard for the important principle that gender equality, not merely
marriage equality, is the foundation upon which the guarantees of
autonomy, personal liberty, and self-determination rest.
For the foregoing reasons, laws banning same-sex marriage violate
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The
judgment of the Court of Appeals is hereby reversed.

